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OLD THINKING AND THE NEW ·EUROPE:
THE PERSISTING INFLUENCE OF DE GAULLE AND THATCHER

David M. Wood
University of Missouri - Columbia

In M~ay 1992 French President Franc;ois Mitterrand and German Chancellor Helmut·

Kohl reached agreement on the upgrading of the recently formed Franco-German brigade to
corps status . -The "Eurocorps" will reach full strength by 1995 and will be open to the
'

_inclusion of components of armies of other European members of NATO which are also
members of'Westem European Union (WEU). British Prime Minister John Major sought
belatedly and unsucce~sfully to forestall the Franco-German agreement by suggesting a l~ger
WEU force,· including units from all member countries and "earmarked for NATO" (The
Economist, May 23, 1992: 51-53). In this initiative Britain was playing its traditional role
as surrogate for the United States in the face of French efforts to draw Germany away from
its commitment to NATO and its willingness to follow US leadership in security matters
(Allen, 1988: 49-50). Chancellor Kohl, in insisting that the Eurocorps would remain tied to.
NATO, was exhibiting ·Germany's usual reluctance to make a clear-cut choic.e between the
United States, NATO's leader,_ and France, which, under General de Gaulle in 1966, had
asserted its independence of US hegemony by leaving the NATO ·command structure..
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Today the.European sec~rity picture is vastly different from what it was in de
Gaulle's time, given the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, the end of the Cold War confrontation
between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe, and the rise of ethno-nationalist
armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia and the former USSR. Even today, when the
danger to the security of Western Europe seems much more remote and progress in the
European Community toward economic and monetary union much more significant than in
the de Gaulle era, whenever security issues arise the principal Western European states still
C

•

-revert to their traditional stances vis-a-vis one another and vis-a vis the erstwhile ,;hegemon".
French securi~y policy positions arid the political style of President Mitterrand cannot be fully
understood without an understanding of de Gaulle's legacy. It can be predicted that elements
of "Gaullism" will continue to guide the decl~tions and actions of French policymakers in
the future, whatever their political color may be.
Although he did not write on a blank slate, Charles de Gaulle was decisive in shaping ·
the French approaches to European political and security questions, elements of which are
still visible today. Margaret Thatcher, who, like de Gaulle, was the most significant leader
of her country since World War II, had less of an impact on British approaches to the same
questions than did de Gaulle on his side or than she herself did on domestic policy matters.
I

.

However, she did act in such a way as to reassert traditional British policy positions (Smith,

1988: 9-10) and to make it more difficult for her successor to depart from them. Analysts
of her policies toward Europe have noted similarities between her defense of state
sovereignty and de Gaulle's (Frankliri and Wilke, 1990: 11-12; Treverton, 1990,-704). The
following discussion compares the approaches to Europe of Charles de Gaulle and Margaret

3
'

Thatcher as part of their overalLpolitical strategies. The two approaches will be analyzed for·
similarities and differences, and

an assessment will be made of the longer term influence of

each leader.

De Gaulle and Thatcher: General Similarities

Charles de Gaulle and Margaret Thatcher were both in power for about 11 years and
both experienced a decline in public support preceding their resig'nations. More important
were similarities in their conceptions of leadership. Both insisted upon their own
independence of special interests, including in de Gaulle's case, political partjes. De Gaulle
actually institutionalized this independence; constitutionally distancing the President from
parliamentary_ controls. Thatcher made imperviousness to !Ilfluence a part of her political
· style. She denigrated the more mall~ble leadership styles of her predecessors. Like de
Gaulle, she was not adept at building coalitions with European partners
(Allen,
1988: 39).
.
Like the General (Kolodziej, 1974: 52, n. 63), she appeared to be quite comfortable in
saying "no"; but she is less renowned than he was for the skillful use of silence (Cerny,
1980: 66; Sharp, 1991; 408).

In both cases the intent of a personalized and independent leadership style was to
demonstrate to a disenchanted public that the state could be strong and purposeful (Cerny,
1980: 46-47; Gamble, 1988: 31-32). This was designed to reawaken

oi vindicate national

pride that had been frustrated by signs of uncertainty and division among previous, leaders.
Symbolism was employed toward this end in the public personalities both leaders displayed.
In terms of national power in the international arena, both leaders, having inherited
poor cards when they took office, wished to improve their hands. Both directed attention
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and resources toward national defense, believing a strong defense, including a nuclear
deterrent, to be the ultimate guarantor of national independence (Harrison, 19-81: 55-57;
Tugendhat and \Vallace, 1988: 75-77). Both de Gaulle and Thatcher, albeit from quite
'

different views Qf political economy, worked. to strengthen their nations' economies,
recognizing that 1the estimates of their countries' weight in the eyes of other international
actors would be ~eavily influenced by economic indicators (Hoffmann, et al., 1964: 77;
Tugendhat and 'Yallace 1988:. 22-25). Both enjoyed personal authority that could not be
transferred to th~ir successors (Tugendhat and Wallace, 1988: 25).
With res~ect to the European Community, both were consisten,t, though not
completely infle,µble, in their opposition to the principle of supra.nationality. Neither would

accept the idea of Europe as providing the .octal basis for supranationality. There were
Frenchmen and Englishmen, not Europeans, in the sense of an integrated society· or
"identikit" culturl (Cerny, 1980: ~5-48; The Economist, September 24, 1988: 61). Both

pre~erred intergofernmental cooix,ration to centralizm dee~~• in ~e maldng of
policy, and both

l·led

.

~ f~

that such a framework would optinure therr chances of bnngmg

partner states along with them in policies of their own choosing (Grosser, 1982: 188; Allen,

I

·- -

1988: 36, 49). _ien frustrated in such objec~ves, both preferred to employ other avenues
rather than to yield to the combined preferences of partner states, although de Gaulle was
I

freer from domestic .constraints in that respect, and Thatcher's goals for the EC were less
ambitious, thus less ~lnerable to rebuffs by other governments (George, 1990: 164-165).
Both regarded monetary and fiscal policy, as well as external relations, ·as "high policy"
matters to be decided by tbe principal executive leader, exercising-vigilance against
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threatened loss of.national independence (Wise, 1989: 61-63; Smith~1988: 26-27).

De Gaulle and Thatcher: General Differences
Similarities in style should not be overemphasized. Both leaders displayed styles in
,_

foreign affairs that fit their.respective national diplomatic traditions. De Gaulle epitomized
the French belief in the-existence of rational solutions to problems discovered through the
application of intellect and fitting within a grand design. Application of the design, however,
-

was guided by intuition as well as by intellect, both exercised in mesure (Cerny, 1980:
41-42, 70). Thatcher had less of the traditional British pragmatism than the typical British
leader; indeed, her attacks upon her predecessors, especially Edward Heath, were attacks
upon their failure to remain true to principle (Riddell, 1983: 22, 44). But her own fidelity
to principle was more evident in domestic policy; it is difficult fo document a grand design in
her foreign policies. With the exception of her stance.toward the EC, her foreign policies
were in accord with the .traditional, pragmatic, lines of British foreign policy, the continuity
for which was assured by the Foreign Office (Byrd, 1988: 2). Even in the case of her EC
disputes over the budget and over Economic and Monetary Union, she did not deviate from
j

Foreign Office and Treasury policy ~bjectives so much as she did in the vehemence with
!

which she insisted upon them. In this, her intuitions sometimes clashed with the intellects of
her advisers (George, 1990: 206-208).
De Gaulle was President during a period when the predominance of the United States
in Europe bad reached "its apogee and was t~tering at the brink of_ decline (Ginsberg, 1989:
"'

265-266). In de Gaulle's version of "rational egoism" (Keohane, 1984: 66-67), F.rance's
position in Europe, including both the European Community and the Atlantic Alliance,

should be directed toward the goal of hastening the decline of US hegemony in Europe
(Hoffmann, 1974: 301-302). His objection to British membership in the Community and his
withdrawal from th~ Atlantic defense organization (but not from the Alliance) both can be
deduced as logical foves emanating from this objective. By Thatcher's Prime Ministership British diplomacy had f<;>r four decades been
premised upon Churchill's recognition of the need to maintain a privileged partnership with
the United States which would enable Britain to exercise influence over the European policies
of the hegemon (Nortnedge, 1983: .28-29). Originally a pragmatic wartime recognition of
Britain's transatlantic dependence in security terms, this cornerstone of British foreign policy
was strengthened· after World War II by the emergence of the Cold War and by a growing
sense of economic dependence. The latter continued for Britain into the 1960s and 1970s,
while continental European countries were closing the economic gap, if not reducing their
security dependence, on the United States. Prime Minister Thatcher saw no reason to alter
traditional British support for US Alliance leadership; indeed, her personal ideological
solidarity with Ronald Reagan strengthened it (Sanders, 1989_: 179). She may even hav~
believed that her personal influence with Reagan had restored Britain's self-ascribed-postwar
capacity to interpret for the transatlantic partner what was needed in E;urope.
As noted in the previous section, both Thatcher and de Gaulle were committed to
strong national defenses, including credible nuclear deterrents. Both led their countries
during. a period when the
credibility of the US .nuclear deterrent, especially- in the eyes of
\
Western Europeans, was in decline, de Gaulle at the beginning .of the time-span and Thatcher
at the end. De Gaulle wanted French defense capacities to be independent of NATO and saw

the French nuclear deterrent as an independent reinforcement of the American deterrent,
improving the credibility of Western retaliatory intent in Soviet minds, and in French,
German, and even American minds as well. When the first French atomic bomb was tested
in February 1960, it was_already conceived as making realizable de Gaulle's independent
nuclear striking force, the force de frappe (Kohl, 1970: 93-106), which .has remained
'I

separate from NATO coordination and thus has not been subordinate to, US-determined
NATO- strategic doctrine (Howorth, 1990: 207). The intended role of the British nuclear
deterrent vis-1-vis the Soviets was a different matter. Under Thatcher, as under her
-

I

predecessors, deployment of British nuclear weapons has been developed and updated in
close partnership with the United States (Vivekanandan, 1991: 413), a double-edged
advantage which France was denied (Kohl, 1971: 50-51).
De Gaulle argued that an independent Fren~h defense capability would add
'

-

qualitatively to the psychological effect of the Western defense posture because of the greater
credibility of the threat to use it by a European power concerned for defending its own
territory. Although it is likely that he believed this to be a valid. assumption, the force- de
frappe was also a key to de Gaulle's assertion of political independence vis-a-vis the United
States and to his pretensions to grandeur (Harrison, 1981: 49-57). It might even be argued
that de Gaulle's political uses of the French deterrent were. of greater importance than the
military· use, because he calculated that Soviet offensive designs toward Western Europe,
r

.

apart from West Berlin, were figments of the imagination of NATO strategic designers. For
her part, Thatcher believed that strengthening British defenses within NATO would add
quantitatively to the aggregate psychological impact of NATO's posture (Sharp, 1991: 403).
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In this respect, too, she did not depart, as de Gaulle most emphatically had done, from her
country's longer-standing strategic doctrine. Britain had always acted as if it believed in
Soviet aggressive predilections. While the British deterrent was "independent" in the sense
that Britain could decide for itself whether to use it or not in the face of an uncertain US
commitment to the defense of Western Europe, it was not seen as a tool for gaining political
ends as ambitious as independence and grandeur. At most, the goal was to gain respect. from
Washington as an equal interdependent partner in order to c'?ntinue having influence over US
policies toward European security (Sanders, 1989: 242-246).
But Margaret Thatcher did have a non-traditional view in the realm of domestic
policy, if not what could be called a grand design of her own (Kavanagh, 1987: 9-13). It
was also a view that contributed to her intransigence on matters of EC policy.
"Thatcherism" sought the removal of the state from the economy in Britain, while
strengthening the state's c~pacity to resist societal forces seeking to use the state to promote
thei(partial interest to the detriment of the national welfare (Gamble, 1988). This led her to
approve of the trade liberalizing initiatives of Project 1992, while attempting to bring EC
spending under control (George, 1990: 160-162) and guarding against the centralization of
state-like powers in the hands of the EC Commission. Limiting the EC' s independence
accorded with her opposition to centralized state control over the economy generally and to
the loss of British state sovereignty in areas, such as monetary policy, where she felt the
1

state should play a role (Allen, 1988: 45-46; Franklin and Wilke, 1990: 11-13). [l] De
Gaulle's opposition to an accretion of the Commission's powers was primarily on .the
grounds of loss of state sovereignty (Kolodziej, 1974: 49-50) .. To· the e~tent that he held

r
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consistent views regarding the .role of the French state in the economy; they accorded with
traditional French skepticism about t~e viability of an unregulated economy, adding an
upper-class disdain for laissez faire capitalism (Cerny, 1980: 53). This meant that·the
French state should play an active role in promoting inqustrial moderniz.ation, economic
growth and social reconciliation; but it should be the French state, not a super-state in·
Brussels.
In fact, de Gaulle's grand design for Europe required a leading role for France as
defender of Europe's global interests. A supranational Europe would be a Europe with
divided political leadership, ineffectual at the level of international haute politique. His
concept of France as European leader lay behind both his 1958 proposal of a joint directorate
of Western leaders, the United States, Britain and France, to "funcµon on a worldwide
political and strategic level" (quoted in Grosser, 1982: 187), and also his 1963 rejection of
British entry into the Community (Hoffmann, 1974: 302-303). For her part, Thatcher
wanted only for Britain to remain politically autonomous within Europe. A weak EC would
'

not be a threat to British independence. Whereas de Gaulle saw the United States as the
chief threat to France's (and Europe's) independence, Thatcher saw Europe as a potential
constraint on Britain's ability to follow interests that largely coincided with those of the
United States.

It could be argued that, in adding a free market orientation to a de Gaulle-like· defense
.of state sovereignty within the EC, Mrs. Thatcher contributed to the eventual realization of a
Gaullist objective--the attainment of a Europe with a more independent self-identity which
would nevertheless be a Europe of sovereign states. Under Thatcher, Britain displayed
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"greater willingness to assert national priorities, rather than to assume--as it does in its
awroach to the international economy--that the operations of the international order are
generally favorable to British interests ... " (Tugendhat and Wallace, 1988: 29, emphasis
added). Economic unity would foster close political coordination, but would not lead to the
abandonment of each state's capacity to pursue an independent course when it deemed it
necessary, a likelihood that would diminish over time as states came to define their interest

in common ways. This was Thatcher's conception of the EC that would emerge from
implementation of the Single European Act (SEA). In doing her best in the "Eurosclerosis"
years, 1979-1983, to legitimize the free market/strong state "paradigm" as a substitute for the
"Keynesian Welfare State", she provided a reformulation of the basic nature and future
orientation of Europe that may have contributed to the psychological regeneration,, or
renewed "Europhoria" of the latter 1980s.[2]
During the first Thatcher administration (1979-83) there was considerable tension
between her approaches to both East and West Europe and those which the Foreign Office
had been pursuing. Ideologically and temperamentally, she preferred to take stronger stances
against both Soviet and EC initiatives that displeased her, than did the sophisticated and
bureaucratic Foreign Office (Smith, 1988: 9). By her second term, the Foreign Office had
succeeded in educating her to the value of a more diplomatic style (Allen, 1988: 47-48).
This "took" permanently irt the case of her position toward the USSR, as is discussed below.
As (for the EC, the period from 1984 to 1988 represented an era of creative British
diplomacy, with Mrs. Thatcher's hostilities kept under control for the most part, and the
British playing an effective role in limiting the scope of Project 1992 primarily to initiatives
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on which Mrs. Thatcher and the Foreign Office could agree (Allen, 1988: 40-41; Cameron,

1992: 59-63).[3]

Policies toward "Significant Others"

The United States. Where differences between Thatcher and de Gaulle were greatest
was in the ways they perceived and behaved toward the three "most significant others" for
both of their countries: the United States, the USSR, and the Federal German Republic. In
general terms, different stances toward the United States played a major role·in producing
different stances toward the Soviet Union and West Germany. In 4e Gaulle's case, the grand
strategy subsumed attitudes toward all three. This can be summarized in two words:
"grandeur" and "independence". Grandeur for France did not signify pretensions to
superpower status. What de Gaulle objected to was the notion that the world had become
divided into blocs led by superpowers who would permit France to attain no more than a
middle rank in world politics (Hoffmann, 1974: 190). The hegemonic actions of the United
States as superpower had "robbed the nation-state of its raison d'etre." (Kolodziej, 1974:

42). But the subjective view ofFrartce held by the rest of the world and'the French
themselves could be elevated through inspired statesmanship (Harrison, 1981: 52-54). The
subjective nature of grandeur suggests that it would be difficult for French leaders to
maintain it in the absence of an inspired. statesman. Most important was the capacity of such
a statesman to employ nationalistic symbolism to draw together the populace of a divided
nation and to leave an enhanced sense of national pride with them after his departure (Cerny,

1980: 80-88).
National independence for France was a more tangible objective than grandeur. It

'

12
meant a capacity of the French state to judge for itself in each case whether the wishes of a
more powerful state, or some collectivity of states, would be in the best interests of France
and to align itself with those wishes or not, depending upon the judgmen~ made (Harrison,
1981: 49-51). The existence of a hegemonic power, the United States, in the early postwar
period had deprived the French state of such independence, and de Gaulle was determined to
recapture it. The Cuban missile crisis convinced him that the United States remained the
superior world power in the 1960s (Grosser, 1982: 199). This, ~ong with the ending of the
Algerian War, provided him the leeway to steer a course that often clashed with US
objectives, including the French exit from the NATO military ·organization and the
development of the independent French nuclear strike force (Kolodziej, 1974: 44-45). He
believed that such steps would not diminish the capacity of the United States to protect the
vital interests of the Western bloc (ibid.: 185).
Britain's relations with the United States since World-War II have exhibited neither
grandeur nor independence, and the Thatcher period is no exception to this generalization.
Prime Minister Thatcher continued the pursuit of the "special relationship" with the United
States, subscribing to the Kennedy view that Britain should bolster the "European pillar" of
the Atlantic Alliance (Allen, 1988: 49). This meant that acts of independence were few and
far between. But, from the Thatcher point of view, the benefits (most notably US support in
the Falklands War) have outweighed what to de Gaulle would have been an unacceptable
cost, the existence of an asymmetrical interdependence"(Sanders, 1989: 179-180). Again,
Mrs. Thatcher was not departing from long-standing habits of British foreign policymakers in
according US policy initiatives the benefit of the doubt. In the context of European security,
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she was concerned that the US commitment to. the defense of Western Europe not be
weakened as a reaction to irritating acts of independence by the Europeans (Smith, 1988:
16-17). De Gaulle, for his part, had proceeded under the assumption that, in the long run,
US interest in European security. would diminish, an assumption which he used to justify his
challenge to US hegemony in the 1960s.
The Soviet Union. The very sharp difference between "Gaullist" and "Thatcherite"
views of relations with the United States is essential to an understanding of their different
i

ways of approaching the Eastern regional hegemon, the USSR. De Gaulle is generally
credited with having been a pioneer in exploring the possibilities of East-West detente. Until
·the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev to Soviet leadership, Margaret Thatcher was, like Ronald
Reagan, a latter-day cold warrior (George, 1990: 144; Sanders, 1989: 193-194.)
De Gaulle's overtures toward the East were primarily in the service of his quest for
independence vis-a-vis the United States. He desired a world in which states would be free
to form, break and re-form alliances independent of ideological affinities, and he acted as if
such a world had returned in his day (Kolodziej, 1974: 39-42). Whether he believed in the
reality of such a model is less important than the fact that acting as if he did helped to create
perceptions on the part of others that France at least, if no other state, was free to move
about in the no-man's land between the two blocs. But when it came time to demonstrate on
whose side France really stood, as in the cases of the Khrushchev era crises--Berlin, U-2,
and Cuba--de Gaulle sided with his Western allies (Grosser, 1982: 185). Mrs. Thatcher did
so not only in crises of East-West relations (Afghanistan, the Korean jetliner), but also in
cases where the United States was pitted against Middle Eastern foes--the Iran hostage crisis,
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· Lebanon, the bombing of Libya (Sanders, 1989: 180-184) and, in the last months before her
resignation, the Gulf War. She was, to be exact, less supportive of Reagan's policy of
selective economic sanctions in Eastern Europe, and of various US ventures against alleged
Soviet surrogates in Central American and the Caribbean (Vivekanandan, 1991: 417; Smith,

1988: 19-23).
In the era of Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin, the US and Soviet hegemonies in

Europe no longer exist. Just before Gorbachev took the reins of power he visited Britain and
impressed Thatcher with his visions of a Soviet Union moving toward political and economic
freedom. The harmony between his concept of perestroika and her free market orientation
brought from her the acknowledgement that he was "a man with whom we can do business"
(George, 1990: 168). As Ronald Reagan's change in thinking about what he had called "the
evil empire" came after Margaret Thatcher's, further circumstantial evidence was provided
for the British belief in the special influence over US perceptions of Europe that accompanied
the special relationship.
,

Although British foreign policymakers could not have pr~icted the swiftness with
which Eastern European states detached themselves from Soviet: influence, they had begun to
think in terms of an opening to the East by the NATO states.

ls

the events in Central and

Eastern Europe unfolded in 1989~90, Thatcher sought to convinbe
her EC partners that an
I
l,

extension of EC policy competence beyond trade liberalization,

r.g.,

toward full Economic

and Monetary Union, would be counterproductive until new rel~tions could be worked out
I
with the USSR and the Eastern European states (Franklin and Wilke, 1990: 12). This
I!
accorded with her aversion to considering Britain as part of "Europe", if defined narrowly as

I

'I

t
I

I

I

I
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the EC member countries.

It is entirely possible that de 'Gaulle would, from his different perspective, have
wanted to seize similar opportunities in Central and Eastern Europe. He .would certainly,
like Thatcher, have been cautious about Economic and Monetary Union and opposed to full
Political Union or any form of European federalism, although EC widening to include
post-Communist European countries might have appeared to him as too confining an
approach for France to endorse. His approach would certainly have taken into account the
future role that France might play in the region, arid he would have paid a great deal of
attention to what was happening in Germany.
The Federal Republic. Part of de Gaulle's strategy in seeking greater political
independence from the United States involved an effort to make the Federal Republic of
Germany likewise more independent. In this he had some encouragement from Konrad
Adenauer in his later years as West German Chancellor (Grosser, 198~: 189-190). The
."special relationship" between France and West Germany·was rendered perfunctory in 1963
when Ludwig Erhard succeeded Adenauer, from which point de Gaulle's chances of
exercising positive leadership in Community foreign policymaking were essentially foreclosed
(Hanrieder and Auton, 1980: i25-126). However, de Gaulle and Adenauer had succeeded
in institutionalizing Franco-German summit meetings. Foreign policy matters continued to
be discussed and lower-level cooperative ventures launched.
I

German unification is not an outcome that de Gaulle would have welcomed. Although
he gave Adenauer moral support at the time the Berlin Wall was erected, he saw the Wall as
symbolizing the de facto division of Germany. He hoped for a1 settlement of the "German

16
question" that would leave Germany divided and West Germany reconciled to the division
(Hanrieder and Auton, 1980: 105). The fact that de Gaulle could not entirely avoid paying
lip service to the aim of German unification in order not to alienate the West German
government suggests how divergent his scenario for Germany's future was from that in
Bonn. Despite having a more productive economy, West Germany remained more passive
than France in political terms during the de Gaulle/pre-Willy Brandt years, usually following
policy initiatives from Washington, rather than those 'from Paris.
Margaret Thatcher's views of Germany became publicly perceptible only in the wake
of Helmut Kohl's rapid advance toward German unification. Her close Cabinet associate,
Nicholas Ridley, was likely expressing her views as well when he called Economic and
Monetary Union "a German racket to take over Europe;'' and complained that France had
)

become Germany's "poodle" (Treverton, 1990: 705; The Economist, July 14, 1990: 61).
.
.
Within the EC the Thatcher government found the effort to keep France and Germany from
uniting agains! Britain to be a recurrent preoccupation _(Moravcsik, ·1991: 52-61).

In broader terms, Britain was content to see West ·Germany continue to play a
relatively passive political role during the Thatcher years. By the time Mrs. Thatcher came
to power, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's influence was wanirtg, although Foreign Minister
Hans-Dietrich Genscher continued to explore poten~al openings to the East during the
unpromising post-Afghanistan, late Schmidt and early Helmut Kohl period of the early
1980s. Meanwhile, the NATO twin-track policy moved ahead in the face of spirited
opposition by the anti-nuclear movements in both West Germany and Britain.
In the Kohl era official West German policies gave Britain ·little cause for concern
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prior to 1989. There were signs that Kohl's occasionally heavy-handed behavior in EC
summit meetings (notably in the March 1984 Brussels meeting) irritated Mrs. Thatcher
(Taylor, 1989: 7-8), perhaps because it violated her conception of properly deferential
German behavior. But it seems evident that his swift moves to effectuate German unification
in late 1989 and early 1990 caught her off guard and elicited a very emotional anti.;Kohl,
perhaps even anti-German, response (New York Times, July 16, 1990: A6). The hostility
was returned, if with more circumspection (Frankel, 1990). The emerging Germany
appeared to Thatcher to be taking advantage of a sudden vacuum to drive for hegemony
within Western and Central Europe, while, after initial objectiol\S, Presiden~ Mitterrand was
following Kohl's lead (Comfort,- 1991). What was far worse, President Bush quickly
accepted Bonn's call for swift unification and was proceeding to treat Germany as if it were
now the most favored Western partner. The status of Britain's special relationship with the
United States, which had been the rock solid base on which Britain had rested its policies
toward both Western and Eastern Europe, appeared suddenly problematic (Sharp, 1991:
396).[4]
By the spring and summer of 1990, Mrs. Thatcher's voice was considerably muted in
EC summit meetings and in the Houston conference of the seven leading economic powers
(Lewis, 1990; New York Times, July 9, 1990: A8). She appeared to be drifting, while
others--especially Kohl and EC Commission President Jacques Delors--had seized the
initiative. Then, at the beginning of August, by which time Kohl had accomplished all that
was necessary to bring about Germ~ unification, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait restored the
image of Britain as Washington's most reliable partner (Sharp, 1991; 406). Thatcher
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recovered her confidence (New York Times, August 31, 1990: A13) and waded into the late
October EC summit in some prepared to do battle with Kohl and Mitterrand (New York
Times, November 2, 1990: A3). But the coalition in favor of the one-year delay of the
second stage of Economic and Monetary Union had been effectively forged and all she could
do was publicly vent her frustration at the evidence of her isolation within the EC-12. A
month later she was out of office.
Thatcher's political demise occurred for complex reasons, but her misjudgment
regarding her ability to block developments in the EC, when skillful British diplomacy might
have limited the damage, appears to have been the final indicator for many of her colleagues
that a change of leadership w~s necessary (Apple, 1990). Perhaps she had staked too much
psychic capital in a particufar view of the world to be able to assimilate anomalous events
such ~s those that were taking place in Europe. The implications of Gorbachev and his
revised interpretation of Soviet security needs was a new element that she had recognized but
had ,been unable to translate into a new intellectual political-security framework to guide
Britain's policies.

Their Successors and the Relevance of Their Models Today ·
De Gaulle's successors, one after the otlier, through the differences in their-personal
styles from that of the General, gradually scaled dowri official French pretensions to
grandeur and independence, ending the damage inflicted by de Gaulle's policies to
Franco-German relations and to France's role in the EC (Hanrieder and Auton, 1980:
130-134). Yet the weight of opinion among commentators is that there has not been much
difference in substance between de Gaulle and his successors, ·including even Fran~is

j
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Mitterrand (Willis, 1982: 9-15; Aldrich and Connell; 1989: 4-5). France remains outside
'

,the NATO command structure and maintains its own independent deterrent, it continues to
provide military assistance to client regimes in Africa, and it still attempts to distinguish its
position on Middle East issues from that of the United States. While Gaullist Georges
Pompidou remained faithful to the broad policy lines of-his predecessor, albeit with a
shrinking resource base with which to maintain the appearances· of grandeur, Vaiery Giscard
d'Estaing was kept partially within ~ose lines by the necessity to appease his Gaullist
coalition partners (Howorth, 1990: 207-208). "In transcending Gaullism; Fran~ois
· Mitterrand's ... ·achievement has been to appear more Gaullist that the General through the
shrewd use of declarations and symbols, while quietly discarding a certain amount of Gaullist
.

.

policy." (Ibid.: 208). For example, while reaffirming his c9mmitment to an independent
nuclear deterrent, Mitterrand called for the deployment by NATO of Pershing II and Cruise
Missiles, although not, of course, in France. Ort the other hand, while working within the
context of UN and EC efforts to find non-military solutions to the conflict in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, he employed the symbolism of a dangerous visit to Sarajevo to dramatize the
need to open a lifeline to its beleaguered Moslem inhabitants. This gesture, which was
apparently not subject to prior consultation, was something that de Gaulle might have done
himself.
"The end of the superpower confrontation has left France with no fence tO sit on, no
new alignments to exploit, no obvious need for expensive parts of its nuclear arsenal." (Toe
Economist, November 23, 1991: Survey France, p. 4). France is now promoting EC
defense cooperation, is playing a _l~ding·role in steering the EC-12 toward Economic and
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Monetary Union and Political Union and did, after all, join in the US-led military coalition in
the Gulf War. It is very difficult to imagine General de Gaulle ·steering such courses (ibid.:
p. 12). They would not have been compatible with his belief that grandeur and independence
require acts of differentiation, and-it seems especially likely that he would have perceived
that the collapse of Soviet hegemony in the East had removed whatever inhibitions he had
,

'

felt against taking independent positions in crisis situations. By contrast, the current French
government reacted to early signs of a revolution in East-West relations with extreme
caution, perhaps because of the feared effect it would have on Germany's. commitments to•
Western Europe.
Indeed, it appears that French foreign policy today has become less ~venturesome ,
arid certainly less productive in areas outside of Western Europe itself, with the possible
exception of Francophonic Africa (Howorth, 1990: 213-214). Most notably, France has
deferred with reservations to the United States in the Middle East. The Franco-German link
has become indispensable in a way it never was for de Gaulle. An effort to assert a positive EC leadership role for France has occurred under all three of de Gaulle's successors: under
Pompidou with the package of innovations accompanying the acceptance of British entry,
under Giscard with his support for the European Monetary System and direct elections' of the
European Parliament, and under Mitterrand, in his strong support for the Single European
Act, Economic and Monetary Union, the European Social Charter and EC coordination of
high tech policies to reduce dependence on the United States and Japan in area such as
telecommunications and computer technology (Moravcsik, 1991: 54-57; Wise, 1989:
55..;63). Under Mitterrand the French government's commitment to the Common
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Agricultural Policy (CAP) and its support for the French farm sector has diminished,
permi,tting a reduction in CAP's share of the EC budget and a diversion of EC funds toward
the recent Mediterranean entrants to Community membership (Moravcsik, 1991: 55-56). In
'
the 1988 presidential'·election campaign, Mitterrand and his Gaullist opponent, Jacques
\

....

Chirac, vied with each other in avowing their European credentials (Howorth, 1990: 211).
Notwithstanding)nstances in which Mitterrand has come onto the stage "playing de
Gaulle," the General's style appears to be non-reproducible for France today. The decline of
bipolarism has opened up the potential for the new Russian state, and for China, Japan and a
possibly united Europe to steer courses that are intended to be for each of them independent
of all the others. The ''New World Order" may be a very fluid one with elusive, transitory ·
alliance patterns. For the moment at least, NATO provides a structural stability that none of·
the full members seems to be in a hurry to set aside. But France is seeking to edge fellow
EC members in the direction of making the EC, in some guise or another, the inheritor of
NATO's military/security role, sans ·the United States. Mitterrand has even hinted· at a
"Europeanization" of French defense policy, which could mean a willingness to give up
strictly independent French control of de Gaulle's force de fra1me (The Economist, January·
18, 1992: 48).
The post-Thatcher British government has shown few signs as yet of changing the
Thatcherite course--only the Thatcherite style. But the style was never as central to Mrs.
Thatcher's foreign policy as it was to de Gaulle's, or for that matter as it was to her
domestic policy. The government of John Major, with Douglas Hurd kept on as his Foreign
Secretary, continues its efforts to protect British sovereignty in EC councils and to follow the
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US _lead, while maintaining an input into US deliberations (Vivekanandan, 1991: 416-417).
Departures from the substance of Mrs. Thatcher's foreign policy, should they occur, would
simultaneously be departures from the traditional lines of British foreign policy, which has
remained reasonably constant throughout a very volatile period.
Although Margaret Thatcher _did not elaborate a personalized doctrine for British
foreign and defense policies, it should ·be repeated that the doctrine she virtually embodied _in
domestic policy, "Thatcherism", has implications for international affairs, which her
diplomatic actions often seemed to recognize. She clearly believed that a free domestic
market cannot be viable unless open to outside competition, which depends upon a world in
which barriers to trade have largely been removed. State•intervention in the domestic
economy and state· restriction of external trade are synonymous in Thatcherite thinking. The
same applies to EC intervention and trade restriction (Sharp, 1991: 407). She distributed
her criticisms of trade restrictive policies evenhandedly among Japan, the United States and
her EC partners (Allen, 1988: 48-49). Mrs. Thatcher's successors have shown fidelity to
. her economic policy principles in continuing to support free trade within the EC and the
opening of a larger European Economic Area of the 18 EC and EFTA members.
The libenµ British position on external trade contrasts with the traditionally more
protectionist French approach that has sought to counter adverse market forces in guiding the
destinies of French -industry and agriculture. On this score the British have, on occasion,
shown the capacity to form temporary coalitions with the Germans, whose social market
approach has at times been steered in a decidedly liberal direction, as under former
chancellor Ludwig Erhard. Although it may be necessary for Prime Minister Major to await

23
the departure of Chancellor: Kohl from the scene, the increasing German misgiv!flgs about
EMU, especially concerning the eventual replacement of the D-Mark by the ECU, might
weaken the alliance with Paris much sooner, especially in view of the resignation of
Francophile Hans-Dietrich Genscher as German Foreign Minister. Uneasiness over being
drawn by France into an. ill-defined military arrangement external to NATO and subject to
strong US criticism could further loose~ Germany's inclination to go along with French
initiatives (The Economist, May 23, 1992, 52). Skillful diplomacy by John Major could
bring about a realignment among the "big three" of *e EC that could slow the progress
toward European Union while restoring some of the relevance of NATO for the post-Cold
War Europe.

"

Among the concessions which Prime Minister Major succeeded in gaining during the
December 1991 Maastricht Treaty negotiations was an acknowledgement, basically by
France, that any future development of a European defense area under the auspices of the
emerging European Union must be compatible with the North Atlantic Treaty obligations of
member states (The Economist, December 14, 1991: 52). One can argue either way as to
whether Britain or France gained the greater ground on this issue. Essentially, the question
of how European states will organize their defenses in the future remains open until Germany
throws its weight decisively on the British (NATO) or the French (EC) side. It is an irony
of recent political upheavals in Europe that it is the .British government, following traditional
lines of British foreign policy, as faithfully interpreted by Margaret Thatcher and her
successor, that is most consistently pursuing and defending Charles de Gaulle's concept of.a
Europe in which, while seeking coordinate action, states retain the option to pursue their own
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'objectives independently.

Conclusion
Seen in broader historical perspective, Charles de Gaulle and Margaret Thatcher both
reached back a century or more for their visions of a future Europe and how to achieve it.
Each provided a general argument about how to gain and maintain international peace and
security. As a. conservative nationalist in the Bismarckian tradition, de Uaulle believed that a
stable international equilibrium could best be achieved in Europe· if there were several strong
but relatively equal states capable of forming, dissolving and re-forming temporary coalitions
to maintain a balance of power. Comparing Otto von Bismarck to Adol~ Hitler, de Gaulle
once observed that Bismarck "knew when to stop." (Quoted in Cerny, 1980: 36). The
objective of the strong state should be to assure international stability by acting in order to
prevent the emergence of a hegemony,.not to achieve one for itself.
.

,

For Margaret'Tha,tcher, liberal principles of poli!ical economy as old as Adam Smith
provided the appropriate guide to achieving international political stability. Britain needed a
strong state, in her estimation, in order, not only to defend British political interests, but also
to have the· freedom to embrace the ubiquitous international economic interdependence of her
day, not to engage in self-defeating efforts to protect the national economy from forces
beyond the control of even the most powerful state (fugendhat and Wallace, 1988: 24, 32).
The answer for an individual economy is what it was for Britain in the mid-19th century, to
show bold leadership in engaging freely the new world economic order. From this point of
view, closer economic ties with European partners are for the best, so long as they do not
result in the legendary '.'Fortress Europe."
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In 1984, shortly before his death and a half-"decade before the collapse of communism.
in East Central Europe, the British historian Hugh Seton-Watson wrote: "Let us stop
thinking of the Soviet colonial empire as permanent, and stop speaking of the EEC's
neo-Carolingian empire as Europe." (Seton-Watson, 198_5:.14) He meant that Europe as a
geographic-cultural concept not only included Britain but extended eastward at l~st to the
western boundaries· of the then Soviet Union. Within this eastern extension lived peoples
who thought of themselves as Europeans, sharing a common history with Europeans to their
west as well as with their fellow nationals. The release of ethno-nationalism in parts of this
area would not have surprised Charles de Gaulle, but he too thought of these peoples as
Europeans. Margaret Thatcher does not consider herself a European in most senses of the
word, but she understands the national aspirations that are being· expressed by Slovenes and
Slovaks, and she would agree with Seton-Watson to this extent: that if "Europe" must be
defined to include Britain, it should also include Central and Eastern Europe. But, in
✓

operating from models that emphasize state sovereignty over cooperative internationalism,
Gaullism and Thatcherism provide little that is useful to guide today's European leaders in
· coping with ethno-nationalist exc~sses.
The Europe that faces the present successors of de Gaulle and Thatcher is a Europe
without hegemons, one in which France has failed to capture the initiative that de Gaulle
would have expected of it in the present conditions of :fluidity and uncertainty, and in which
Britain must reexamine political stances premised upon the "Atlantic pillar" and the "special
relationship. " It is also one that contains an ambivalent candidate for hegemony, unhed
Germany. In the absence of a true EC political union with the capaGity to steer a coherent
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and independent foreign policy to the formulation of which Germany, Britain and France
contribute with rough equality, it would seem that neither Gaullist "neorealism" nor

-.

Thatcherite "neoliberalism" provides much guidance for dealing with the dangerous
turbulence that is presently occurring in Central and Eastern Europe. This is all the more
true because the continued influence of their thinking in their own countries inhibits the
movements of the governments of those countries in dealing with the emerging problems of
Central and Eastern Europe. The struggling· states of that region have seen the European
Community as the appropriate source of economic and technical assistance and, in Some
cases, of possible political guidance. Such hopes are reminiscent of those that Western
Europe pinned on the United States as the emerging hegemon after World War II
(Remington, 1991: 383). In that period, trade played a decisive role in restoring Western
,-

Europe to strength, but only after an initial period of dollar-assisted reconstruction. The

'

'

problem with the current emphasis on moving to market economies in Central and Eastern
Europe, to be achieved through following IMF austerity plans, is that it prescribes measures
whose short-run consequences are counterproductive when taking into consideration the
immense'political uncertainties in, the regions. Thatcherism has contributed to a mind-set that
prevails throughout the EC and inhibits a creative collective approach to the crisis.
The Yugoslav crisis that escalated to military conflict, then civil war following the·
June 1991 Slovenian and Croatian declarations of independence from the Yugoslav
federation, has provided the European 'community and its leading member states with an
unwelcome opportunity to test their evolving conceptions of post-Cold War European
security priorities.- On August 7, 1991, the EC foreign ministers. met in The Hague to
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consider their Balkan options. The main opposing positions had bee11 set forth by the
German and French governments during the previous month: Germany had advocated
recognition of Slovenia and Croatia as sovereign states, while France had opposed this and
countered with a proposal that forces of the Western European Union be deployed in Croatia
to stop the fighting between Serbs and Croats to make it possible for negotiations to take
place between the belligerents aimed at keeping some sort of Yugo~lavia together. It was
·,

well-known-that German business interests-were better established ·in Slovenia and Croatia
than in Serbia (New York Times, June 28, 1991; AlO) and that France had historic ties with
Serbia, indeed that Germany and France had historically been differently positioned in
conflicts between Serbs and Croats. The Dutch, who held the Presidency of the EC CQuncil
-during the second half of 1991, believed that, while hostilities continued, it would be
premature to give Slovenia and Croatia diplomatic r~ognition, and that it would also-be a
mistake for the EC to do anything more .on the ground in Yugoslavia than to continue
seeking a sustainable cease-fire. In this the Dutch were supported by Britain and iµost of the
other EC members. The Hague Declaration that emerged warned Serbia that ifit continued
to violate EC mediated cease-fires, the 12 would impose economic sanctions against Serbia,
but not against Slovenia or Croatia. In issuing this warning it tilted toward the Gerrn:an
position, but not to the extent of according the two breakaway republics diplomatic
recognition (The Economist, August 19, 1992: 37-38).
While the August 1991 compromise could be interpreted as the_ r~sult of a
Franco-British alliance which thwarted Germany's desire to recognize Slovenia and Croatia,
it is not clear that the German position at that time had hardened against Serbia to the extent
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it did shortly thereafter (New York Times, August 8, 1991: AS). During the fall, 'as the EC
sought in vain to gain a viable cease-fire, German public opinion was moving strongly in
favor of recognition of Croatia, bringing the Kohl government along with it. Finally, on
December 16, 1991, Foreign Minister Genscher declared to his EC colleagues that Germany
would recognize Slovenia and Croatia on its own if the ~C could not do so collectively. The
others gave in at that point, and the two breakaway republics were recognized by Bonn's
January 15, 1992 deadline (The Economist, December 21, 1992: 57). In the meantime,
progress was being made, now under UN as well as EC auspices, to achieve a stable
cease-fire agreement.
In 1992, attention has turned away from still unsettled Croatia to Bosnia ,and

Herzegovina, where a more complex conflict has been drawing the EC further and further
into its vortex. This time Germany, less involved in the new area of conflict, and now
concerned about the influx of the growing number of refugees, has maintained a relatively
low profile. Having taken over the EC Council Presidency for the latter half of 1992,
Britain now finds itself uncomfortably in the middle, whereas President Mitterrand has found
new opportunity for, displaying a de Gaulle-like flair for the dramatic maneuver while leaving
French options open.
The crisis in the Balkans provides little scope for any of the former European Great
Powers to achieve some, of their former grandeur. This seems to have been recognized in
the Croatian phase by Britain and -France and in the more recent phase by Germany. In
various ways all three have shown an understanding that collective responses as members of
the EC, of Western European Union, of the Conference on European Security and
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Cooperation, and (in the case of Britain and France) of the UN Security Council, is the most
prudent and perhaps ultimately the most effective way to proceed. The lowest common
denominator of agreement has been produced· among EC governments wearing their joint
foreign and defense policymaking hats. While France has been brought into the consensus
that Serbia is the party principally to blame, this has not given Germany a free hand to throw
its weight around in· the Balkans, nor has the German government appeared to want it. The
end of the Cold War has clearly not freed the formerly middle-ranked powers of Europe to
stride purposely, each on its own, about the European stage. Charles de Gaulle had more
freedom to do so back in the time when the Cold War lines were clearly drawn. But de
Gaulle, after all, had a game plan. Its principal objective, to rid Europe of the hegemons,
seems to have been realized.
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ENDNOTES

[l] Although the above formulation seeks to minimize the appearance of a contradiction
between "the free market and the strong state, II Thatcher's former Foreign Secretary, Sir
Geoffrey Howe, was not so careful: "In a way, 'state sovereignty' and the inarket are
proving opposites in the late twentieth century--the one is undermining the other--even
though it is interesting to note, one sometimes finds conservatives defending both." (Howe,
1990: 677).

[2] Recently there has been some scholarly recognition of the importance of a sea change in
the economic thinking of EC members that occurred during the early 1980s, stimulated by
the success, attributed to supply side Reaganomics, in bringing down US inflation and,
eventually, unemployment, and the somewhat later success of the more orthodox Thatcher
government following monetarist principles. , The sea change influenced the thinking of other
governments, notably the French, at the time convergence on the Single European Act
occurred (1984-85). See Tsoukalis, 199b 48-49; Cameron, 1992: 56-59.

[3] These included the internal market itself, the institutional changes in the EC budgetary
process designed especially to bring agricultural spending under tighter control and the
strengthening of the machinery for intergovernmental coordination of foreign policies, known
in EC parlance as "European political cooperation". The period ended with Mrs. Thatcher's
October 1988 Bruges speech castigating Jacques Delors and the EC· Commission for its
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efforts to extend Project 1992' beyond these limits to the achievement of Economic and
Monetary Union and a greater emphasis upon the "social charter" (Cronin, 1991: 365-366).

[4] Tugendhat and Wallace (1988: 30) had predicted before the 1988 US presidential

.election: "It is unlikely that any new president, Republican or Democrat, will establish as
close a personal relationship with Mrs. Thatcher, or with any potential successor as British
Prime Minister [as the.Reagan-Thatcher relationship]."
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